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Evidence. What the  U.S. Research Shows about Worker Ownership? 
Joseph R. Blasi, Richard Freeman, and Douglas L.  Kruse1 
 
 What does empirical research show about worker ownership?  The averages show that the 
key indicator of economic performance, productivity, and many other measures related to firm 
performance are higher for firms that operate with profit-sharing and employee stock ownership 
than for otherwise comparable firms that do not follow those practices.  The averages also show 
that workers in firms with shares and participatory work relations have higher compensation, 
stay on the job longer, and offer more suggestions for improvement than workers in other firms.    
 
Starting Points  
   
 Several researchers, including the authors, have reviewed this work.1  In 1995 Christopher 
Doucouliagos undertook a meta-statistic analysis of the evidence.  Metastatistics is a technique 
widely used in medical science to put together results from many disparate studies to assess the 
magnitude and significance of coefficients from those studies in one fell swoop.  It combines 
estimates from individual studies from different data sets, samples of different size, and subject 
to different biases or data imperfections, into a single estimate covering all studies.  The notion is 
that the imperfections across studies are random so that averaging gives a more accurate estimate 
of reality.   
                                                      
1 This chapter is adopted from  “Evidence” in The Citizen’s Share, the authors’ Yale University Press book 
(2013)   
with the permission of Yale University Press. 
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 The scholars who have reviewed many studies plus newer studies not covered in the 
reviews—over 100 studies total--find that firms with share arrangements average better 
outcomes than otherwise comparable firms without share arrangements.  The magnitude of 
effects is usually on the order of  2 percent to 5 percent.  Meaningful profit sharing generally has 
larger effects on output than employee stock ownership.   Combinations of programs–employee 
stock ownership and profit-sharing or a stock purchase plan and profit-sharing–have larger 
effects on output than individual programs by themselves.   
 To turn to specific studies, there are five important studies of the effects of share approaches 
on outcomes outlined in Appendix I.  The British government sponsored the first study, arguably 
the best existing study that uses standard production function methodology.  The General 
Accountability Office (GAO) of the U.S. Congress sponsored the second study.  Both of the 
governments wanted to know whether policies that encouraged firms to introduce share 
approaches in their respective countries improved the productivity of firms, as proponents of the 
policies had predicted when the legislation was debated.  Government sponsorship gave 
researchers access to financial and production information on firms that was not in the public 
domain.      
 The study commissioned by the British Government’s Treasury department examined 
whether programs that gave firms tax incentives to introduce individual stock ownership, profit-
sharing, and employee stock options affected the economic performance of those firms.  Because 
they were the government they had access to the private financial records of the companies.  The 
quality of the data and number of firms covered “made the study as close as we could imagine to 
giving a definitive analysis of tax-advantaged modes of shared capitalism on productivity”.  The 
analysis covered a sufficiently large proportion of the United Kingdom’s economy to suggest 
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that broad-based employee ownership improved performance economy-wide.2  A parallel study 
of publicly available information of corporations with broad-based capitalism in the U.K.  by 
Alex Bryson of the London School of Economics and Richard Freeman gave comparable results 
and found that the effects were greatly influenced by management giving workers greater 
autonomy in decision-making.3 
 The General Accounting Office study examined 414 firms that set up Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans in 1976-1979 when ESOPs were just getting off the ground.  The research 
design matched each ESOP firm with a similarly sized non-ESOP firm in the same industry.  
Again, the government had access to private financial information of the companies.  This study 
found that a combination of employee stock ownership with a supportive corporate culture raised 
productivity whereas ESOPs by themselves without a supportive culture had no statistically 
significant effect on output.4   
 The third study, by Joseph Blasi and Douglas Kruse, followed the design of the General 
Accounting Office study and looked at 300 privately-held firms that set up ESOPs between 1988 
and 1994 and compared each ESOP firm to similar companies of the same size in the same 
industry, but without an ESOP.  It found that the ESOP firms had significantly higher sales 
growth and higher sales per worker and were more likely to have survived through 1999 than 
matching firms without ESOPs.5 
 The fourth study was a field experiment in which researchers were allowed to randomly 
assign profit sharing to several stores, helping overcome concerns that other factors could be 
responsible for any changes in performance.  The stores where profit sharing was established had 
increases in productivity and profitability, and decreased turnover, relative to a group of stores 
that were not assigned profit sharing.6 
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 The last study differs from the others by relying on management reports on quality of output, 
financial performance, and worker turnover rather than on financial and production data.  It gives 
a similar picture: firms do better when they combine a participatory company culture with profit 
sharing and employee stock ownership.7 
 Finding a positive relation between broad-based capitalism approaches such as employee 
stock ownership and profit sharing and firm output across many studies shows that something 
real is going on with corporations that adopt profit-sharing or employee stock ownership.  To get 
a better sense of what that real something was, in 2000 we initiated the Shared Capitalism 
Research Project at the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts8.  
In contrast to the studies just discussed, which obtained information from companies about their 
performance as firms, we sought information from workers about what was happening at their 
workplaces. 
 
The NBER Shared Capitalism Study 
 
 Our study surveyed over 40,000 employees in 14 corporations. The companies included large 
multinationals traded on major U.S. stock markets, important high technology innovators large 
and small, medium-sized corporations and smaller factories with ESOPs (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans) and financial service firms and other service-oriented companies spread across 
just over three hundred workplaces around the country and in their foreign divisions.     
 Our initial plan was to pair firms that had profit sharing and employee stock ownership with 
their closest competitors who paid workers solely with wages or salaries per unit of time, but this 
plan did not pan out.  Fourteen firms with some form of broad-based capitalism agreed to 
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participate in the study but their competitors were unwilling to participate.  We feared this would 
not give us enough contrast to reach firm conclusions about broad-based capitalism. To use the 
medical science analogy we had firms that were trying the medicine but did not have evidence on 
the control firms without the medicine.   
 
 A Control Group for the Study 
 
   We recognized that to the extent that broad-based capitalist arrangements improved outcomes, 
the absence of firms without such programs would likely bias downward estimates of those 
impacts.9  While it is always desirable to have a representative sample, second best is to have a 
sample biased in a given direction since that means that if the results are in that direction, they 
understate the effect and thus provide a lower bound in what the relevant policy accomplishes.  
We obtained information from the U.S. Government’s General Social Survey national survey on 
workers in firms that had no employee stock ownership or profit sharing in order to obtain a 
valid control group.  The survey measures can be found in our earlier book Shared Capitalism at 
Work.10. 
 
What We Found? 
  
 The first finding from the worker surveys in the NBER Shared Capitalism study was that 
shares and work practices varied widely inside and across these 14 companies.  We gave each 
worker a score based on how much ownership he or she had in their company and how much he 
or she shared in profits and stock options.  The scores varied substantially among workers.  Some 
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had a large ownership stake.  Some had little.  Some were in establishments with a strong gain-
sharing or profit-sharing programs.  Others were not.  We then compared workers who had 
different shared capitalism scores but who were similar in their occupation, their fixed wages, 
supervisory responsibilities, tenure with the company, gender, age, disability, and so forth.  
Sometimes we analyzed how economic outcomes varied among workers within the same 
company.  Sometimes we analyzed how economic outcomes varied among workplaces.   
 While we had too few companies in the NBER study to compare companies, as noted, we 
used the General Social Survey sample of workers, who are chosen at random from the country 
as a whole and thus likely to represent single firms, to compare workers in companies with and 
without broad-based capitalism.   We found that workers with higher shared capitalism scores, 
that is, the combination of worker ownership and profit sharing, were more committed to their 
employer along a variety of dimensions than those with lower scores and that these workers were 
better off in a host of important aspects of their work lives.  In particular, workers with greater 
property in corporations in firms are more likely to stay with the company, are more loyal, are 
more willing to work harder, make more suggestions, and have better fixed pay and working 
conditions.    
 
More Likely to Stay With Their Firm 
 
 Management in most firms seeks to lower the rate of turnover.  The reason is that recruiting, 
training, and integrating new employees into a work force costs money, time, and effort.11  Our 
measure of turnover was whether workers intended to look for a new job – a strong predictor of 
actual future turnover behavior.  In the National Bureau for Economic Research study, nine 
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percent of workers with high levels of profit sharing, employee stock ownership, or stock options 
reported that they were likely to look for a new job compared to fifteen percent of employees 
with low levels of shared capitalist compensation–a difference of six percentage points in the 
likelihood of staying.  Among individual forms of shares, profit or gain sharing was associated 
with the lowest turnover.  But the combination with employee stock ownership had an even 
greater impact in reducing turnover. 12  To see if this result fit the nation we examined responses 
to an similar question on the General Social Survey and found that fifteen percent of workers 
with profit-sharing, stock options, or employee ownership were likely to leave their firm 
compared to a fifth of workers without any form of broad-based capitalism–a difference of five 
percentage points.   
 
Have Greater Loyalty and Pride Working For the Firm 
 
 Fifty-eight percent of workers on the National Bureau for Economic Research study with a 
high level of shared capitalism reported great loyalty to the firm compared to forty-six percent of 
workers with low amounts of such shares.  The national General Social Survey asked a 
comparable question about whether workers were proud to work for an employer.  Forty-four 
percent of workers with a high level of shared capitalism reported a high level of pride compared 
to twenty nine percent of workers without employee stock ownership or profit or gain sharing.  
Workers with profit or gain sharing expressed the highest loyalty while those with employee 
stock ownership and stock options had somewhat more modest increases in loyalty that still 
exceeded that of workers without these forms of shares.  Workers with the combination of the 
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different forms, namely, employee stock ownership and profit shares, showed the greatest loyalty 
to their firm and greatest pride in working for it. 
 
Express Greater Willingness to Work Hard 
 
 To obtain a measure of the work effort that employees give to their firm in the NBER study 
of 14 companies we asked: To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement: I am 
willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the company I work for succeed.   The 
proportion who strongly agreed was 36 percent for workers with high levels of broad-based 
capitalism compared to 30 percent for workers with no shared capitalism.13  Workers with profit 
sharing and gain sharing were at the top of the willingness to work hard ladder whereas those 
who had just broad-based employee stock ownership and stock options did not differ from other 
workers.  Remember that we are only comparing workers with stock shares versus profit shares 
without, for the moment in this discussion, taking into consideration the corporate culture of their 
companies.  Employee stock ownership, as many other studies done over the last forty years 
indicate, works mainly with a supportive corporate culture and the types and approach employee 
ownership matter a lot. 
 
Make More  Suggestions 
 
  We asked workers  in the NBER study how often they made suggestions to their firm and found 
that among those with some form of broad-based capitalism, 26 percent made a suggestion at 
least once a month, compared to only 18 percent among workers without shares.  Employee 
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stock ownership had a larger impact than profit-sharing on making suggestions but the most 
effective practice, here as elsewhere, is to combine employee stock ownership and profit sharing 
with supportive work practices.14  Ownership gives workers a capital stake in the company.  
Profit-sharing gives them short-term capital income.  Employee involvement programs of diverse 
sorts such as worker town meetings, open door policies, self-directed work teams and worker 
problem-solving committees, encourage workers to participate in decisions.  Workers in firms 
with employee stock ownership and profit sharing and supportive work practices not only make 
more suggestions than workers in other firms but they also report that management was more 
likely to heed their suggestions than did workers in other firms.   Another U.S. study found 
similar results. 15  
 One large company in the NBER project especially interested in innovation asked us to add 
questions to our survey of their corporation to find out whether their workers perceived a culture 
of innovation, or not, at their workplace.  The responses to these questions showed that workers 
who had shares, a cooperative culture, and mutual monitoring were most likely to view the firm's 
culture as positively inclined toward innovation.  One has to look beyond measurements of 
“effort” in order to really understand broad-based capitalism in the new workplaces today 
because a lot of the success of work teams in the current post-industrial economy has to do more 
with ingenuity and innovation rather than sheer physical or mental effort.  Citizens across the 
nation do a lot less heavy lifting and pushing and pulling and shoveling and carrying and putting 
things on and taking things off than they did fifty years ago.  Much of this effort is now done by 
machines so what happens in teams and between workers and with workers and customers is far 
more important.  New research by Dan Weltman indicates that the initial effect of employee 
share ownership on individual workers appears to kick in at very low thresholds in influencing 
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the frequency with which workers make suggestions and whether they ideas for innovations 
rather than slight improvements.   The effect on their overall company loyalty and their 
willingness to work on innovations appears to increase as share ownership expands.16    
 
Have Better Wages and Work Conditions 
      Do workers gain from a property stake in their firm?  The question may strike some readers 
as a clumsy set-up to an obvious answer.  However, some critics of employee shares believe that 
when workers have a stake in ownership, this stake comes at the cost of lower wages or other 
benefits so that on a net basis, workers may not be better off with profit-sharing or employee 
ownership or otherwise.  It is entirely possible that this is how shares could end up.  In fact, some 
managers believe in what they call “pay at risk” by putting the worker under the maximum 
possible pressure to earn even fair wages. 17  Our evidence dispels this criticism and supports the 
“obvious answer.” 
 There is strong evidence that employee stock ownership and profit sharing have meaningful 
impacts on workers’ wealth.  The NBER study found that workers with profit-sharing or 
employee stock ownership are higher paid and have more benefits than other workers.18  This 
means that the substantial profit sharing and gain sharing and ownership stakes for the typical 
worker in these plans tend to come on top of (not in place of) fair fixed wages and benefits, as 
many other studies have found.19  These workers also obtain more training and have greater job 
security than other workers, and enjoy better work conditions with greater participation in 
decisions, better treatment by the employer, and less supervision.20  These better conditions are 
consistently linked to profit-sharing, although some of the conditions are also better for workers 
with gain sharing, stock options, and employee stock ownership.  Being eligible for profit 
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sharing or being an employee-owner by itself is associated with better wages and work 
conditions.  But the size of a profit or gain share, the value of the employer stock ownership 
stake, and the size of the potential stock option profit are also associated with much better 
conditions for workers. 
 
What About Those Free Riders? 
 
 The classic free rider objection to broad-based capitalism–that profit-sharing or employee 
stock ownership in a large group cannot succeed because each individual has an incentive to 
shirk.  Since all workers presumably know that everyone thinks this way, the gist of this criticism 
is that ownership stakes and profit shares will fail to motivate anyone to work hard.  One 
potentially important channel for overcoming the free rider problem is through worker co-
monitoring–the process by which workers with an ownership stake and a profit share take on the 
responsibility of assuring that fellow workers do their part at work places.  Another way to think 
of it is mutual support, encouragement, coaching, or that good old-fashioned word, help.  While 
the notion that co-monitoring can reduce free-rider behavior is an old one in analysis of team 
production, until the National Bureau for Economic Research’s Shared Capitalism Project no 
major survey had documented co-monitoring behavior, linked it to shares and the structure of 
work, and examined how it affected employee performance at workplaces.  
    We used both the NBER and the GSS survey to study this issue.  On the U.S. General 
Social Survey of workers across the United States, seventy-seven percent of workers said that 
they too could observe their co-workers’ performance.  On the National Bureau for Economic 
Research’s fourteen firm survey, sixty-two percent of workers  said that they can figure out what 
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their fellow worker is doing.  Given that most workers could observe the effort of co-workers, 
we next asked how likely it was that they would take action involving “a fellow employee not 
working as hard or well as he or she should”–anti-shirking behavior, supporting the fellow 
worker.  Workers varied a lot in their answers to this question.  Some said it was very likely they 
would talk directly to the employer about their fellow shirking worker.  Some said they would 
speak to a supervisor or manager.  And some said it was very likely they would do nothing.  The 
size of an employees' workplace was an important factor in these differences.  In the NBER 
survey a workplace with less than 10 employees, 44 percent of workers said they would 
definitely respond in some fashion to seeing a fellow employee shirk whereas in a workplace 
with over 100 workers, only 35 percent said they would respond.  Since getting a shirker to 
shape up has smaller benefits to other workers in a larger workplace, this is free-rider behavior at 
work in monitoring free riding!  
   What we discovered was that workers with employee stock ownership or profit-sharing or 
gain-sharing are more likely to step forward and take action and support the shirking fellow 
employee more than other workers without shares.  In the 14 firm survey of corporations with 
some form of broad-based capitalism, the intensity of profit-sharing and gain-sharing was the 
most important factor in whether workers would take action for cash profit sharing.  For shares 
of stock, workers took action against shirkers just as a result of owning any company stock or 
holding any employee stock options.  In the General Social Survey, where some workers are in 
firms with no programs at all, the presence of profit-sharing and gain-sharing and employee 
stock ownership was the most important determinant of anti-shirking behavior.  But it was the 
combination of the different share approaches with personnel practices that create an ownership 
culture that induced the most co-monitoring behavior: being part of a team, having a high 
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participation in decisions, being treated with respect by their supervisor, having formal training 
and job security, and being paid relatively well for their job.  By contrast, when workers were 
paid large individual bonuses they were less willing to get involved with a shirking co-worker.  
If you and I are competing for a bonus, why should I help you perform better?–the worse you do, 
the more likely I get the bonus.  It is the team reward that generates cooperation and the 
willingness to take time and effort to press other workers to produce up to speed.  
   We added questions to the NBER survey to find out if the workers had ever actually seen a 
fellow employees not working as hard as they should, and what the employee had in fact done.    
Thirty five percent of the workers said that the employee who was not working well resented it.  
But forty five percent said that the other employee appreciated the action and forty percent said 
the supervisor appreciated it.  Over one third said the employees' performance improved but 
nearly the same proportion said the employees' performance did not improve, and one third did 
not know.    
  
The Nation's Best Employers 
 
 Every year the Great Place to Work Institute reviews the applications of major corporations 
who seek a place on the list of “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” that Fortune 
Magazine presents with great fanfare.  Because being named one of the hundred best is an honor 
that can attract additional and better job applicants and help retain and spur current employees 
and bring companies lots of acclaim and attention, every year about 400 of the largest and most 
successful corporations apply for consideration and compete.  The shares of half of the 
corporations applying are traded on the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ, where 
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they represent twenty percent of the market value of the public stock market and ten percent of 
employment and sales of all stock market companies.  Because of this, any study of shares 
among the applicants is a study of a major slice of America’s corporations and the American 
economy.  This study, entitled, “Do Broad-based Employee Ownership, Profit Sharing, and 
Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?” is forthcoming in the British Journal of 
Industrial Relations in 2016. 
 To determine the 100 Best Companies to Work For, the Great Place to Work Institute queries 
managements about their corporate culture and practices and obtains data on turnover and other 
aspects of work practices and corporate culture.  The Institute then surveys a random group of 
each company’s workers and asks them how they are paid–with cash profit sharing, employee 
stock ownership, and broad-based stock options–and their attitude towards the company and 
behavior at work.  Between 2006 and 2008 over 1300 corporations applied for the 100 Best 
Companies to Work for in America competition.  Over 300,000 of their workers filled out the 
Great Place To Work Institute survey that ultimately determines whether a corporation makes the 
100 Best list and where it places on the list.  The Institute uses the survey responses to develop a 
comprehensive indicator of corporate culture called the Trust Index that measures workers’ view 
of the credibility, respect, fairness, pride and camaraderie of their company.   
 The Great Place to Work Institute gave us limited access to their data under strict 
confidentiality procedures to examine the relation between employee stock ownership and profit 
sharing and work practices and the performance of applicant firms.  We sought to determine 
whether firms that gave their workers some property stake were disproportionately represented 
among applicants and whether firms with greater degrees of shares and work practices performed 
better than their peer firms with weaker or no such programs.   
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 Since firms with exceptional human resource policies and corporate cultures self select into 
the applicant pool, comparisons of outcomes within this group are likely biased against finding 
any effects for broad-based capitalism approaches such as employee stock ownership and profit 
sharing.  A firm that believed its practices merited recognition as among the 100 Best and that 
did not have profit-sharing or employee ownership presumably had other policies to reward and 
motivate workers (an especially well-designed promotion system? generous worker friendly-
benefits?) that would compensate for the absence of those programs.   One can presume that 
many applicants were trying very hard to be “the best” corporations. 
 It is interesting that a large proportion of the applicants for the 100 Best Company to Work 
For competition had some form of employee stock ownership or profit sharing for their workers.  
Eighteen percent had ESOPs.  Eighteen percent had cash profit or gain sharing plans.  Twenty-
two percent had deferred profit sharing plans.  The average ESOP in the sample owned about 17 
percent of company stock.  One tenth of the companies were even majority worker-owned.  One 
in six companies granted stock options to a majority of their workers.  Another 17 percent of the 
companies granted stock options to between a quarter and half of all the corporation’s workers. 
The average profit sharing or gain sharing plan provided a worker a 7 percent bonus on top of 
their pay.    
 We discovered that corporations with more extensive employee ownership and profit sharing 
had higher scores on the Trust Index.  The workers in these corporations rated their company as 
more credible, respectful of workers interests, fairer, and as providing greater participation in 
decisions than workers than other firms.  ESOPs and profit sharing plans where profits added a 
lot to annual salary topped the list in the Trust Index.  Workers with stock options did not differ 
much on the Trust Index from workers without those options.  Corporations with more extensive 
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broad-based capitalism had reduced voluntary turnover, increased employees’ intentions to stay 
with the firm, and higher return on equity for the firm.  Corporations that combined shares with 
participative work practices and a supportive corporate culture had the biggest payoff in reduced 
turnover and higher return on equity.  Finding these effects in the non-representative “100 Best 
Companies to Work For” sample strengthens the likelihood that the policies have a causal impact 
on employee well-being and firm performance.21 
 
The Importance of Participative Ownership Culture 
  
 Every worker has the discretion to try harder, work harder, think more creatively, cooperate 
with fellow workers or choose not to cooperate.   Management cannot get into workers’ minds 
and tap into this discretionary effort.  This is a matter of free choice.  It is either given or not 
given by the individual person through a complex set of perceptions, motivations, and 
judgments.  Corporations can observe activity but corporate supervisors cannot control what 
goes on inside the head of the independent person who can grant discretionary effort or problem-
solving capacity or not out of their own mind.  In the post-industrial workplace much of what the 
workers has to do is not a matter of mere effort or extra time.  If a worker has ownership of the 
company and finds that the corporate culture throws up barriers to his or her discretion to try 
harder through physical or mental or emotional or social effort, then it is difficult to imagine how 
broad-based capitalism can be tied to better performance.   
 The statistical evidence that firms in which workers have a property stake in their firm are 
more productive, induce more worker effort and responsibility, spur workers to innovate more, 
and produce diverse other benefits for workers and the corporation shows that this is a viable 
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organizational form of capitalism.  It pays off, at least for those firms and workers that choose it.  
It is important to recognize that most research studies show that a very thin layer of shares--a 
stock option or two for every bank teller in a large publicly-traded bank–is not going to make 
much difference.  The impacts are larger when the programs are meaningful as they are in many 
closely-held ESOP companies and some model publicly-traded companies.  But shares are not 
simply about workers getting more money in the pocket from an ownership or profit stake and 
firms benefiting with lower turnover, greater work effort, and higher production.  It is also about 
the firm and its employees developing a culture that supports employee participation and 
cooperation between management and employees over the long term.  The corporations and 
workers that do best combine shares and workplace practices in the context of a participative 
ownership culture.  Our analysis found that giving workers more responsibility, having more 
teams and problem-solving groups, having a less hierarchical workplace where supervision 
involved more coaching than control, paying workers at or above the market rate for their fixed 
wages, and providing workers with greater training opportunities defined this culture. 
    One fascinating question is whether firms that adopt employee stock ownership or profit or 
gain sharing are likely to also adopt a supportive corporate culture.  The answer is yes.  Our 
national surveys show that workers in these firms report significantly more participation in 
solving company problems through employee involvement teams and self-directed work teams, 
and say they have more influence, and, in some cases, more training.  Managers appear to be 
either increasingly inferring the better company culture or learning from each other as they 
compare one company to another.  This is also underlined with new data on our British Journal 
of Industrial Relations study.22 
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 Extending these practices to more workers and firms, and strengthening the practices in the 
workplaces where they exist, offers a road for normal workers to tap into the wealth embodied in 
corporate property.    
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Appendix 5.1.  Five Studies of the Relation Between Shared Capitalism and Firm Outputs 
Study 1: UK Treasury Sponsored Study of British firms (2007).   This study obtained data from 
confidential tax records that identified firms that had approved profit-sharing plans, Save as You 
Earn plans, and company share option plans for 16,844 firms.  It linked this data to company 
value added, employment, profits, and capital for 7,633 businesses.  The study covered enough 
firms and years to permit the analysts to conduct a panel study of firms that entered or left the 
programs as well as to compare firms with and without the programs at a point in time, and to 
examine whether the effects differed among industries.  The conclusion: “on average, across the 
whole sample, the effect of tax-advantaged share schemes is significant and increases 
productivity by 2.5% in the long run”  
Study 2:  General Accountability Office of the U.S. Congress (1987).  This study examined 414  
corporations which established Employee Stock Ownership Plans that were set up between 1976-
1979 when ESOPs were just getting off the ground in the United States.  The companies were 
mostly small and medium size businesses whose stock was not traded on a public stock market. 
The average company was just under ten percent owned by its workers. The study matched the 
ESOP firms with non-ESOP firms in the same industry and of the same size and compared 
outcomes three years after employee ownership started to two years before.  The conclusion:  By 
itself employee stock ownership did not change performance but the combination of employee 
stock ownership with a change in corporate culture was associated with an increase in 
productivity “fifty two percentage points higher than the change for firms that did not have such 
employee involvement.”  
Study 3: Blasi-Kruse study of ESOPs set up between 1988 and 1994.  These were small 
businesses with about four hundred workers each.  The study compared ESOPs to similarly sized  
 
 
20 
businesses without broad-based employee ownership in the same industry a decade into the 
future. Workers in the ESOPs had a capital ownership stake of about $15,000, were five times 
more likely to have a traditional pension plan, were five times more likely to have a 401k plan, 
were four times more likely to have a profit sharing plan, and seven times more likely to have 
another retirement plan than workers in the non-ESOP companies.  The ESOPs had significantly 
higher sales growth and higher sales per worker than the companies without employee 
ownership.  The ESOP corporations survived longer and had fewer bankruptcies.  By 1999 
almost seventy percent of the employee ownership businesses were still in existence compared to 
only fifty-five percent of the non-employee ownership companies.  A 2002 follow-up on all 
ESOPs found similar results.      
Study 4.  This is a field experiment based on 21 fast-food franchises owned by one firm, where 
researchers were allowed to randomly assign profit sharing to 3 franchises and non-financial 
incentives (social recognition and performance feedback) to 6 franchises, with the remaining 12 
as the control group.  A pre/post comparison using monthly data found increased profitability 
and productivity, and decreased employee turnover, in the profit-sharing franchises relative to 
the control group.  In addition, profit sharing had a more immediate positive effect on 
profitability and productivity as well as a greater long-lasting effect on employee turnover 
relative to the non-financial incentives.      
Study 5:  A 2003 survey of just over a thousand establishments in the State of California done at 
the Goldman School of Public Policy at the University of California at Berkeley came to similar 
conclusions.  Managers’ assessments of quality, financial performance, and the turnover of 
workers were best when a participatory company culture was combined with profit sharing and  
employee stock ownership.  
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